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	In	Defence	of	Inactivity:	Boredom,	Serenity,	and	Rest	in	Heaven		
The	oldest	stories	in	the	world	are	stories	about	how	man	once	had	just	nothing	to	
do,	and	was	as	happy	as	he	could	be.	–	Northrop	Frye1		
Abstract		
“Dynamic”	views	of	heaven	are	currently	popular,	in	which	the	blessed	spend	
eternity	progressing	and	developing,	as	opposed	to	“static”	views,	in	which	they	do	
not.	This	is,	in	part,	because	dynamic	views	supposedly	offer	a	plausible	solution	to	
the	“Boredom	Problem”,	i.e.	the	claim	that,	given	an	infinite	amount	of	time,	
existence	would	necessarily	become	so	tedious	as	to	be	unbearable.	I	argue	that	
static	views	actually	deal	with	this	problem	more	successfully	than	dynamic	views	
do.	I	argue	that	the	Boredom	Problem	itself	rests	on	the	assumption	that,	without	
activity	to	keep	us	interested,	we	slip	into	boredom	by	default.	I	examine	the	
phenomenon	of	boredom	itself	to	evaluate	that	assumption,	and	argue	that	it	is	
false.	It	follows	that	a	person	in	a	state	of	“serenity”	–	who	desires	only	to	continue	
as	they	are	–	cannot	become	bored.	I	relate	this	to	the	Christian	tradition	of	
conceiving	of	heaven	in	terms	of	rest	and	inactivity,	argue	that	it	is	consistent	with	
the	claim	that	the	blessed	in	heaven	are	embodied,	communal,	and	virtuous	(in	
some	sense),	and	conclude	that	boredom	poses	no	more	problem	to	this	conception	
of	heaven	than	exhaustion	does	to	the	dynamic	conception.		heaven;	boredom;	infinity;	desire;	rest		
Paper		There	is	a	currently	fashionable	view	of	life	after	death,	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	dynamic	view.2	For	proponents	of	this	view,	life	after	death	is	characterised	by	constant	progression	or	change.	The	blessed	in	heaven,	they	say,	are	constantly	advancing	in	their	relationship	to	God.3	They	are	not	unsatisfied,	since	every	advance	brings	new	closeness	to	God	or	understanding	of	God,	but	they	are	never	content	to	rest,	because	every	advance	also	opens	up	new	directions	to	follow.	They	are	like	mountaineers	who,	upon	scaling	a	peak	with	immense	satisfaction	and	sense	of	achievement,	see	a	new	peak	rising	before	them	and	a	new	phase	of	their	journey.		This	view	of	heaven	goes	back	to	Gregory	of	Nyssa	and	his	famous	doctrine	of	ἐπέκτασις	or	constant	striving.4	And	for	some	recent	writers,	such	as	Eric																																																									1	In	Denham	(2002:	221)	2	In	introducing	the	dynamic	view	in	his	edited	volume	on	the	topic,	Eric	Silverman	points	out	that	most	of	his	co-authors	presuppose	such	a	view.	See	Silverman	(2017:	13-14).	3	Throughout	this	paper,	I	use	“heaven”	in	the	vernacular	sense	to	refer	to	the	final,	eternal	destination	of	those	who	are	saved,	whether	it	be	physical	or	non-physical;	and	I	use	“the	2	In	i troducing	the	dynamic view	in	his	edited	volume	on	the	t pic,	Eri 	Silverman	points	out	that	most	of	his	co-authors	presuppose	such	a	view.	See	Silverman	(2017:	13-14).	3	Throughout	this	paper,	I	use	“heaven”	in	the	vernacular	sense	to	refer	to	the	final,	eternal	destination	of	those	who	are	saved,	whether	it	be	physical	or	non-physical;	and	I	use	“the	blessed”	to	refer	to	its	human	occupants.	4	See	e.g.	Life	of	Moses	II.239,	in	Malherbe	and	Ferguson	(1978:	116).	On	the	modern	use	of	Gregory	of	Nyssa	in	formulating	an	answer	to	the	Boredom	Problem,	see	Ludlow	(2007:	132-34).	
	2		
Silverman,	this	view	of	heaven	is	so	self-evidently	superior	to	the	alternative	“static”	view	–	where	there	is	no	change	or	progression	at	all	for	the	blessed	–	that	they	are	surprised	to	find	the	latter	articulated	outside	the	popular	sphere	at	all.5			Those	who	defend	the	dynamic	view	do	so,	in	part,	because	it	seems	to	offer	an	answer	to	one	of	the	key	problems	facing	belief	in	an	eternal	afterlife:	that	of	boredom.6	Given	a	genuinely	infinite	amount	of	time,	some	argue,	people	would	inevitably	become	bored	to	the	point	of	preferring	annihilation.	Clearly,	this	Boredom	Problem,	as	I	shall	refer	to	it,	threatens	to	undermine	the	whole	point	of	religion,	traditionally	conceived.	Proponents	of	the	dynamic	view	of	heaven	reply	that	because	the	blessed	are	always	progressing	in	their	journey	into	the	divine,	they	enjoy	constant	novelty	and	therefore	will	never	become	bored.	Silverman,	for	example,	writes:		 …consider	the	superior	explanatory	power	of	dynamic	views	for	demonstrating	that	an	eternal	existence	can	be	fulfilling	and	meaningful.	On	such	accounts	paradise	can	be	eternally	meaningful	because	there	is	always	more	that	can	be	known	and	experienced	of	the	infinitely	rich	being	of	God.	There	is	always	more	union	with	God	to	be	experienced	and	there	is	always	potential	to	expand	our	finite	ideally	functioning	capacities	for	interacting	with	God.	On	accounts	of	paradise	that	include	an	ongoing	relationship	with	God,	since	the	afterlife	includes	at	least	one	infinite	good	–	God	–	there	is	an	infinite	amount	of	knowledge,	experience	of	God,	and	enjoyment	of	union	with	God	that	remains	to	be	gained.7		But	while	this	vision	may	sound	inspiring,	on	closer	inspection	it	offers	very	little	of	substance.	We	are	told	that	“paradise	can	be	eternally	meaningful	because	there	is	always	more	that	can	be	known	and	experienced”	of	God	(my	italics).	But	why	would	the	fact	that	there	is	always	more	of	God	to	experience,	in	itself,	make	being	with	God	meaningful?	If	I	am	painting	a	wall,	the	activity	does	not	become	more	worthwhile	if	the	wall	is	infinitely	large.	And	what	does	it	mean	to	say,	as	Silverman	does	here,	that	God	has	an	“infinitely	rich	being”?	Does	God,	like	Shakespeare’s	Cleopatra,	have	an	“infinite	variety”	that	custom	cannot	stale?8	Presumably	not	in	quite	the	same	way	–	but	then	what	does	it	consist	of?	Are	there	an	infinite	number	of	activities	we	can	enjoy	with	God?	Can	we	talk	to	God	about	an	infinite	variety	of	subjects?	Can	God	adopt	an	infinite	number	of	personalities	when	conversing	with	us?	As	soon	as	we	ask	questions	like	this,	the	shallowness	of	vague	assertions	of	“infinitely	rich	being”,	without	any	explanation	of	what	that	involves	or	entails	for	our	interactions	with	God,	becomes	apparent.		In	this	passage,	Silverman	does	hint	at	some	possible	explanations.	The	first	is	to	say	that	“there	is	always	more	union	with	God	to	be	experienced”.9	But	this	is	not																																																									5	Silverman	(2017:	16).	6	Silverman	(2017:	13)	presents	this	as	the	first	reason	for	preferring	a	dynamic	view	of	heaven.	7	Silverman	(2017:	24)	8	Antony	and	Cleopatra	Act	II	scene	2	9	Timothy	Pawl	and	Kevin	Timpe	offer	a	similar	conception	of	heaven	when	they	suggest	that	“through	the	everlasting	years	that	the	blessed	spend	with	God,	they	are	neverendingly	coming	ever	closer	to	Him,	who	is	Goodness	itself,	ever	clinging	more	tenaciously	to	Him”	(2009:	418).	
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very	helpful	either.	Assuming	we	can	give	some	meaning	to	the	term	“union	with	God”	at	all,	it	is	very	hard	to	see	how	it	could	be	the	case	that	there	is	always	
more	union	with	God	to	be	experienced.	The	closest	kind	of	union	there	could	be	is	simple	numerical	identity.	If	the	blessed	are	always	becoming	more	and	more	united	to	God,	and	if	they	are	never	actually	becoming	identical	with	God,	then	they	must	presumably	approach	union	with	God	asymptotically	–	the	closer	they	get	to	God,	the	slower	their	approach	becomes.	It	is	not	clear	to	me	why	this	would	be	eternally	satisfying.	On	the	contrary,	it	sounds	more	like	the	fate	of	Tantalus.		Silverman	also	appeals	to	the	“infinite	amount	of	knowledge”	of	God	that	the	blessed	may	enjoy.	This	is	a	common	claim	among	defenders	of	the	dynamic	view	of	heaven.10	But	this	cognitive	conception	of	heaven	as	consisting	of	infinite	learning	does	not	solve	the	problem	either.	What	exactly	will	the	blessed	learn	about	God?	We	are	never	given	any	details	or	examples.	Classically,	God	is	supposed	to	be	perfectly	simple;	how	can	this	generate	infinite	facts	about	God	for	the	blessed	to	learn?	One	might	appeal	to	the	fact	that	God’s	unlimited	nature	means	that	there	are	an	infinite	number	of	things	God	can	do	or	know.	But	while	this	may	be	true,	it	does	not	follow	that	an	eternity	spent	enumerating	them	would	be	interesting,	any	more	than	an	eternity	spent	listing	all	numbers	would	be	interesting.		Perhaps	there	are	satisfying	answers	to	these	questions,	and	an	account	can	be	given	of	what	the	blessed	would	learn	about	God,	why	it	would	take	them	forever,	and	why	that	would	remain	interesting.11	But	no-one,	to	my	knowledge,	has	provided	such	an	account.	Instead,	proponents	of	the	dynamic	view	seem	to	assume	that	merely	asserting	this	view,	without	spelling	out	its	details,	is	explanation	enough.	Despite	its	popularity,	then,	no	version	of	the	dynamic	view	of	heaven	yet	provided	offers	a	satisfactory	answer	to	the	Boredom	Problem.			I	argue	instead	that	the	much-maligned	static	view	of	heaven	offers	a	superior	answer	to	the	Boredom	Problem.	The	answer	can	be	summarised	like	this.	Proponents	of	the	Boredom	Problem	claim	that	there	is	no	activity,	or	set	of	activities,	which	could	remain	interesting	for	an	infinite	duration.	Proponents	of	dynamic	views	of	heaven	reply	by	trying	to	identify	an	activity,	or	set	of	activities,	which	could	remain	interesting	for	an	infinite	duration	–	normally	by	appealing	in	some	way	to	the	infinity	of	God.	But	an	alternative,	and	in	my	view	superior,	strategy	is	to	accept	that	no	such	activity,	or	set	of	activities,	exists	–	but	to	reject	the	assumption	that,	in	their	absence,	boredom	must	set	in.	In	this																																																									10	See	e.g.	Vaughan	(1922:	73);	Vardy	(1995:	23-24);	Ward	(1998:	309);	Jenson	(1999:	354-55);	Brown	(2000:	122);	Pawl	and	Timpe	(2017:	99);	Swinburne	(2017:	355).	The	idea	that	learning	is	an	essential	element	of	heaven	is	so	entrenched	that	Jonathan	Kvanvig	argues	that	a	major	problem	with	the	beatific	vision,	as	traditionally	conceived,	is	that	it	would	make	the	blessed	omniscient	and	therefore	there	would	be	“nothing	left	to	learn”	(2017:	64).	11	Perhaps	one	way	of	doing	this	would	be	to	take	the	knowledge	gained	by	the	blessed	to	be	personal,	rather	than	propositional.	Ted	Poston	(2017)	and	Jonathan	Kvanvig	(2017:	71-77),	both	building	on	the	work	of	Eleanore	Stump	(2010:	39-63),	have	developed	such	a	view	of	knowledge	in	heaven,	but	in	response	to	quite	different	problems.	Whether	it	could	form	the	basis	of	an	adequate	response	to	the	Boredom	Problem	remains	to	be	seen.		
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paper,	I	do	this	by	examining	the	Boredom	Problem	in	more	detail	and	showing	how	it	rests	upon	an	assumed	principle,	which	I	call	Boredom	By	Default	(BBD).	I	then	consider	the	nature	of	boredom	itself	and	its	causes,	concluding	that	the	Boredom	By	Default	principle	is	false	(or,	at	best,	only	contingently	true).	I	build	upon	this	discussion	to	develop	an	alternative	concept	of	heaven	as	marked	by	
serenity	instead,	which	could	never	become	boring,	even	if	there	were	no	activity	at	all.	I	argue	that	this	concept	is	deeply	embedded	in	the	Christian	conception	of	heaven	as	eternal	rest.		
Boredom	by	default		Contemporary	treatments	of	the	Boredom	Problem	usually	begin	with	Bernard	Williams’	much-discussed	1973	paper	on	the	subject.	In	that	paper,	Williams	presented	an	argument	which	might	be	summarised	like	this:		(1)	A	state	of	boredom,	continued	indefinitely,	would	eventually	become	intolerable.	(2)	There	is	only	a	finite	number	of	kinds	of	activities	a	person	can	engage	in.	(3)	To	be	meaningful,	immortality	must	involve	stability	of	character.	(4)	Given	enough	time,	any	set	of	activities	will	become	boring	to	a	person	who	has	stability	of	character.	(5)	Therefore,	any	meaningful	immortal	existence	would	eventually	become	intolerable.				But	I	suggest	that	there	is	another,	suppressed	premise,	which	not	only	Williams	himself	but	most	of	his	critics	have	taken	for	granted.	This	is:		(SP)	Given	enough	time,	a	lack	of	activity	will	become	boring	to	a	person	who	has	stability	of	character.		Once	stated,	the	necessity	of	this	premise	for	the	argument	to	work	is	clear.	Williams	assumes	that	the	blessed	must	engage	in	some	activity	or	other,	either	because	an	activity-less	state	is	impossible,	or	because	it	would	be	boring.	This	suppressed	premise	derives	its	plausibility	from	a	more	fundamental	principle,	which	I	will	call	Boredom	By	Default	(BBD):		
BBD:	our	default	state	is	one	of	boredom.			If	BBD	is	true,	then	human	beings	have	an	overall	tendency	to	become	bored,	rather	as	Aristotle	thought	that	objects	in	motion	have	a	tendency	to	come	to	a	standstill	unless	actively	kept	in	motion	by	something	else.	Boredom,	on	this	view,	is	our	natural	resting	state,	to	which	we	inevitably	return	–	against	our	desires	–	unless	something	actively	prevents	us.	So	to	avoid	becoming	bored,	we	must	constantly	act	to	keep	life	interesting.	For	some,	such	a	task	is	impossible.	Lars	Svendsen,	for	example,	describes	boredom	as	“life’s	own	gravity”,	exerting	a	pull	that	can	never	be	fully	resisted.12																																																										12	Svendsen	(2005:	154)	
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For	those	who,	like	Svendsen,	hold	BBD,	the	natural	question	to	ask	concerning	heaven	–	or	any	prolonged	situation	–	is:	what	will	we	do	to	avoid	becoming	bored?	In	the	absence	of	a	satisfactory	answer	to	that	question,	they	conclude	that	boredom	is	unavoidable.		But	if	BBD	is	false,	then	the	fact	that	there	seems	to	be	no	activity	that	would	prevent	the	blessed	from	becoming	bored	does	not	entail	that	they	will	become	bored.	If	BBD	is	false,	then	a	person	who	is	in	a	non-bored	state	might	continue	in	that	non-bored	state	even	in	the	absence	of	anything	to	keep	her	in	it,	just	as,	in	Newtonian	physics,	an	object	in	motion	will	remain	in	motion	unless	something	stops	it.		We	can	see	how	BBD	underlies	Williams’	version	of	the	Boredom	Problem	by	analysing	the	structure	of	his	argument	more	deeply.	He	argues	for	premise	(4)	–	the	claim	that,	given	enough	time,	any	activity	will	become	boring	–	by	appealing	to	the	notion	of	“categorical	desires”.	These	are	desires	which	are	not	conditional	upon	remaining	alive	–	rather,	they	are	the	desires	in	virtue	of	which	we	want	to	remain	alive,	in	order	to	fulfil	them.13	Williams	introduces	this	concept	in	the	first	(and	less	discussed)	part	of	his	paper,	where	his	target	is	Lucretius’	claim	that	we	have	no	reason	to	fear	death.		As	long	as	we	have	categorical	desires,	Williams	contends,	we	do	have	such	a	reason,	because	we	want	to	live	in	order	to	see	these	desires	fulfilled.	But	in	the	second	part	of	the	paper,	where	his	target	is	the	opposite	claim	that	we	should	want	to	avoid	death	indefinitely,	Williams	tells	us	that	a	person	who	lacks	categorical	desires	will	not	want	to	remain	alive.	Williams	speaks,	for	example,	of	a	man’s	need	“for	categorical	desire	to	keep	him	going,	and	to	resist	the	desire	for	death”.14		This	is	an	illegitimate	shift.	Williams	has	argued	in	the	first	part	of	the	paper	that	having	categorical	desires	is	sufficient	to	wish	to	remain	alive;	he	assumes	in	the	second	part	that	having	categorical	desires	is	necessary	to	wish	to	remain	alive.	But	clearly,	even	if	it	is	true	that	having	categorical	desires	would	cause	one	to	want	to	remain	alive,	it	does	not	follow	that	lacking	categorical	desires	would	cause	one	to	want	to	die.			In	the	line	quoted	above,	Williams	assumes	that	there	is	a	desire	for	death	lurking	beneath	our	other	desires,	and	once	our	categorical	desires	have	been	fulfilled,	this	morbid	wish	will	take	over	and	we	will	want	our	own	destruction.	This	is	an	example	of	BBD,	framed	here	in	terms	of	“the	desire	for	death”.	Later	in	the	paper,	Williams	speaks	explicitly	of	boredom	in	similar	terms,	as	when	he	asks	what	features	of	heaven	“would	stave	off…	boredom”.15	The	assumption	that	boredom	is	something	that	must	be	“staved	off”	–	that	in	the	absence	of	some	answer	to	the	question	what	will	stave	it	off,	boredom	is	inevitable	–rests	upon	BBD.16																																																									13	Williams	(1973:	86)	14	Williams	(1973:	91)	15	Williams	(1973:	94)	16	The	very	language	of	“staving	off”	boredom	is	revealing,	suggesting	as	it	does	that	boredom	is	constantly	waiting	to	engulf	us	and	must	be	constantly	fought.	The	“staving	off”	language	is	found	
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		Williams’	discussion	of	categorical	desires	has	come	under	heavy	fire,	but	his	critics	all	seem	to	agree	with	his	acceptance	of	BBD,	or	at	least	to	leave	it	unremarked	and	unchallenged.	For	example,	Donald	Bruckner	argues	that	even	in	an	immortal	life,	there	could	be	unending	variety	of	activity,	because	in	an	infinite	stretch	of	time	new	kinds	of	activities	could	come	into	being.17	But	he	does	not	question	the	assumption	that	activity	is	required	to	avoid	boredom	in	the	first	place.	J.	Jeremy	Wisnewski,	similarly,	argues	that	even	if	one’s	categorical	desires	were	all	to	be	exhausted,	one	might	still	avoid	fatal	boredom	because	they	could	be	reignited	by	external	circumstances.	One	might	have	a	desire	to	master	every	existing	musical	instrument,	but	even	after	this	is	achieved,	new	ones	might	always	be	invented.18	Burley	rejects	this	argument	on	the	grounds	that	any	desire	that	could	be	rekindled	in	such	a	way	would	be	an	intrinsically	shallow	one,	the	pursuit	of	which	would	become	boring	anyway,	and	which	cannot	be	considered	a	categorical	desire.19	But	again,	both	Wisnewski	and	Burley	seem	to	agree	with	each	other	and	with	Williams	that	categorical	desires	are	the	only	thing	standing	between	the	blessed	and	boredom.	They	focus	on	the	problem	of	whether	the	blessed	will	run	out	of	categorical	desires,	but	do	not	question	the	assumption	that,	without	categorical	desires,	the	blessed	will	necessarily	become	bored.		But	is	this	true?	Should	we	grant	Williams’	assumption	of	BBD?	To	answer	that	we	need	to	consider	what	boredom	itself	really	is.		
The	nature	of	boredom		Much	has	been	written	on	boredom,	from	multiple	disciplines.	But	there	is	a	bewildering	lack	of	agreement	about	its	nature.	Authors	on	boredom	cannot	even	agree	on	how	prevalent	it	is.	For	some,	especially	in	the	tradition	of	continental	philosophy,	boredom	is	a	fundamental	human	experience	that	transcends	time	and	culture.	Kierkegaard	famously	declared	boredom	to	be	“the	root	of	all	evil”,20	while	Heidegger	rhetorically	asked,	“Do	things	ultimately	stand	in	such	a	way	with	us	that	a	profound	boredom	draws	back	and	forth	like	a	silent	fog	in	the	abysses	of	Dasein?”21	Some	commentators	find	boredom,	or	closely	related	concepts,	to	be	a	perennial	literary	concern	in	both	the	ancient	and	medieval	worlds.22	But	for	others,	it	is	a	uniquely	modern,	western	phenomenon,	unheard	of	before	the	industrial	revolution	and	the	modern	concept	of	leisure.23		
																																																																																																																																																														elsewhere	in	the	literature	on	this	subject,	reflecting	a	general	assumption	of	BBD.	See,	for	example,	Bruckner	(2012:	632,	633);	Hallett	(2001:	286).	17	Bruckner	(2012:	632-34)	18	Wisnewski	(2005:	33-34)	19	Burley	(2009)	20	Kierkegaard	(1987:	286)	21	Heidegger	(1995:	77).	On	Heidegger	and	boredom,	see	Thiele	(1997).	22	Kuhn	(1976);	Toohey	(1988:	151);	Thiele	(1997:	491)	23	For	a	list	of	examples	of	this	approach,	see	Musharbash	(2007:	208).	
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It	is	common	for	writers	on	boredom	to	point	out	both	the	difficulty	of	defining	the	term24	and	the	vast	range	of	feelings	and	experiences	that	it	covers.25	A	number	of	authors	comment	that	“boredom”	can	refer	to	both	a	trivial,	transitory	experience,	such	as	the	temporary	dullness	of	an	over-long	sermon,	and	something	much	more	profound	and	long-term,	such	as	the	unalleviated	existential	horror	of	a	meaningless	life.26	Nicholas	Lombardo,	however,	claims	that	the	term	“boredom”	and	its	derivatives	seem	to	be	used	univocally	no	matter	what	the	context.	As	he	puts	it,	“we	talk	about	finding	a	conversation	boring	in	the	same	way	that	we	talk	about	finding	our	lives	boring”.27	If	this	is	correct	–	as	I	think	it	is	–	then	the	difference	between	trivial,	temporary	boredom	on	the	one	hand	and	profound,	long-term	boredom	on	the	other	is	one	of	degree,	not	of	kind	–	rather	like	the	difference	between	temporary	and	chronic	pain.28		But	if	“boredom”	always	refers	to	the	same	kind	of	experience,	what	precisely	is	it?	Elizabeth	Goodstein	called	it	“experience	without	qualities”,29	but	while	this	captures	nicely	both	the	difficulty	of	describing	boredom	and	its	monotonous	nature,	it	cannot	be	literally	true	or	we	could	say	nothing	about	boredom	at	all.	At	the	very	least,	boredom	has	the	quality	of	being	unpleasant.		A	common	denominator	to	the	various	available	theories	of	boredom	is	a	sense	of	disconnection	with	the	external	environment.	We	often	associate	being	bored	with	having	nothing	to	do,	but	it	is	perfectly	possible	to	be	bored	while	there	is	plenty	to	do,	if	the	only	activities	available	are	unattractive.30	Indeed,	for	Orrin	Klapp,	boredom	comes	from	having	too	much	to	do,	not	too	little.31	Consequently,	Sandi	Mann	and	Andrew	Robinson	plausibly	suggest	that	boredom	is	a	matter	“of	having	nothing	to	do	that	one	likes”,	which	causes	a	lack	of	stimulation,	leading	to	“low	arousal	and	dissatisfaction”.	32	This	dissatisfaction	leads	the	bored	person	to	become	less	responsive	to	what	stimulation	there	is.33	As	a	result,	there	is	a	vicious	cycle:	the	bored	person,	rendered	unresponsive	to	the	world,	engages	less	with	it,	and	consequently	becomes	still	more	bored	and	still	more	unresponsive.34		Some	commentators	link	the	concept	of	boredom	to	that	of	“meaning”:	boredom	is	what	is	experienced	in	the	absence	of	meaning.35	Lombardo	argues	that	that	does	not	mean	that	the	bored	person	ascribes	to	some	theory	about	the	meaningless	of	life;	a	cheerful	nihilist	might	find	life	interesting,	and	a	depressed																																																									24	Kuhn	(1976:	5);	Musharbash	(2007:	307)	25	Lombardo	(2011:	262);	Brissett	and	Snow	(1993:	238)	26	Kuhn	(1976:	5-6).	27	Lombardo	(2011:	263).	See	also	Kuhn	(1976:	6),	who	cites	Sartre	as	using	the	term	“ennui”	to	refer	to	both	“the	emotion	that	caused	Roquentin’s	nausea	and…	the	bother	of	having	to	locate	a	book	in	the	library”.	28	For	more	on	this,	see	below,	pp.	9-10.	29	Goodstein	(2005:	1)	30	Raposa	(1985:	76)	31	Klapp	(1986)	32	Mann	and	Robinson	(2009:	243),	italics	original	33	Wangh	(1975:	538)	34	Thiele	(1997:	492)	cites	Hamlet	as	an	example	of	this	boredom-idleness-boredom	cycle.	35	E.g.	Raposa	(1985:	76);	Svendsen	(2005:	29-30);	Lombardo	(2011:	263)	
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theist	might	find	it	boring.36	If	this	is	correct	–	as	it	surely	is	–	then	we	will	not	understand	boredom	through	an	analysis	of	what	the	“meaning”	of	life	is.37	Rather,	the	“meaninglessness”	of	which	the	bored	person	complains	is	a	quality	of	their	experience:		 When	people	say	that	they	find	life	boring,	they	are	not	saying	that	they	have	come	to	the	conclusion	that	life	as	such	has	no	meaning,	no	significance,	and	no	purpose.	What	they	are	saying	is	that	nothing	engages	them	about	life.	Their	deeper	desires	somehow	fail	to	latch	on	to	anything	that	presents	itself	to	their	consciousness.38		What	are	these	“deeper	desires”?	Dennis	Brissett	and	Robert	Snow	offer	an	important	insight	here	by	focusing	on	their	social	and	future-oriented	nature.	For	them,	boredom	is	“an	experience	of	the	absence	of	momentum	or	flow	in	a	person’s	life”.39	They	liken	life	to	a	dance,	where	the	rhythm	carries	the	dancers	on	from	the	present	into	the	future.	If	an	individual	becomes	out	of	synch	with	this	rhythm,	she	loses	the	“flow”	and	the	sense	of	progression	into	the	future.	Alternatively,	the	individual	may	be	in	synch	with	the	dance,	but	lack	any	sense	of	“personal	stake	or	direction”	over	where	it	is	going.40	In	such	a	case,	she	lacks	“intention,	choice,	and	purpose”.41		On	this	view,	both	kinds	of	boredom	–	that	caused	by	lacking	flow,	and	that	caused	by	having	no	personal	stake	in	the	flow	–	are	a	matter	of	how	the	individual	interacts	with	the	world	and,	in	particular,	the	rest	of	human	society.	To	claim	one	is	bored	is	not	simply	to	report	a	certain	interior	feeling	–	it	is	“an	emphatic	complaint	of	being	rendered	nonsocial”.42	We	may	note	that	it	is	difficult	to	be	bored	when	one	feels	part	of	a	social	group,	even	when	it	is	mutual	boredom	that	binds	the	group	together.	The	most	boring	lecture,	for	example,	becomes	paradoxically	less	boring	when	one	realises	that	everyone	else	is	bored	by	it	as	well,	and	consequently	feels	affinity	with	them.	This	antagonism	between	boredom	and	sociability	has	another	side	to	it:	a	complaint	of	boredom	may	be	a	deliberate	distancing	of	oneself	from	society,	an	act	of	aggression	or	superiority.43	For	the	aesthete,	to	declare	oneself	bored	is	to	elevate	oneself	above	the	common	horde	and	their	mundane	concerns.	44		Brissett	and	Snow’s	analysis	also	helps	to	explain	another	feature	of	boredom,	highlighted	by	Martin	Wangh:	its	relation	to	the	sense	of	time.	He	points	out	that	the	German	word	for	boredom,	Langeweile,	literally	means	“long	while”.45	To	be																																																									36	Lombardo	(2011:	263)	37	For	a	useful	survey	of	such	analyses,	see	Metz	(2002).	38	Lombardo	(2011:	264)	39	Brissett	and	Snow	(1993:	238)	40	Brissett	and	Snow	(1993:	239)	41	Brissett	and	Snow	(1993:	240)	42	Brissett	and	Snow	(1993:	241)	43	Brissett	and	Snow	(1993:	241-42).	Kuhn	(1976:	12-13)	expresses	a	similar	idea	when	he	argues	that	“ennui”	is	characterised	by	estrangement.	We	may	also	connect	this	anti-social	aspect	of	boredom	to	its	well-known	negative	effects	on	society	–	see	Svendsen	(2005:	16-17).		44	Think,	for	example,	of	the	veiled	aggression	of	Gwendoline’s	claim,	made	“in	a	bored	manner”,	that	“Cake	is	rarely	seen	at	the	best	houses	nowadays,”	when	offered	some,	in	Wilde’s	The	
Importance	of	Being	Earnest,	Act	II.	45	Wangh	(1975:	540)	
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bored	is,	in	part,	to	experience	“a	disturbance	in	the	sense	of	time”.46	For	the	bored	person,	time	drags;	there	is	no	sense	of	progression	into	the	future,	only	an	endless	present.	As	Evagrius	Ponticus	famously	put	it,	the	sun	seems	to	have	stopped	in	the	sky.47	We	can	understand	this	as	a	symptom	of	the	loss	of	“flow”	and	with	it	any	sense	of	purposeful	movement	through	time.	Time	still	passes,	but	it	is	not	going	anywhere.		Drawing	together	these	different	threads,	we	can	say	that	boredom	has	the	following	features:		 (1) It	arises	from	incongruity	between	a	person’s	deeper	desires	–	relating	particularly	to	her	role	in	society	and	sense	of	future	orientation	–	and	her	actual	situation.48	(2) It	is	characterised	by	a	sense	of	“meaninglessness”,	a	lack	of	stimulation,	and	a	feeling	of	endless	present	rather	than	progression	into	the	future.	(3) It	leads	to	psychological	withdrawal	from	the	social	world.	(4) It	is	self-perpetuating:	the	more	bored	one	is,	the	more	bored	one	is	likely	to	become.		What	I	have	called	“incongruity”	in	(1)	needs	careful	explanation.	It	does	not	mean	simply	that	the	sufferer’s	situation	differs	from	how	she	would	like	it	to	be.	That,	in	itself,	does	not	generate	boredom.	On	the	contrary,	it	often	generates	interest.	Whether	it	be	organising	a	political	protest	or	buying	new	furniture,	the	kind	of	activity	undertaken	to	try	to	bring	the	world	into	closer	alignment	with	one’s	desires	can	be	extremely	engaging.	Rather,	“incongruity”	means	that	(a)	the	world	does	not	match	one’s	desires,	and	(b)	there	seems	to	be	no	way	to	bring	it	closer	to	matching	one’s	desires.	The	sufferer	of	boredom	feels	unable	to	do	anything	about	her	situation	–	either	because	of	her	own	powerlessness	or	because	she	perceives	nothing	in	the	external	world	that	provides	an	opportunity	to	act	to	improve	things.	The	political	protester,	by	contrast,	sees	a	world	that	does	not	match	her	desires,	but	she	also	sees	ways	she	can	act	to	try	to	improve	it,	and	becomes	engaged	as	a	result.	For	her,	there	is	“congruity”	between	her	desires	and	the	external	world,	even	though	they	differ.		Together,	these	features	help	to	explain	why	boredom	can,	in	some	cases,	become	so	profound.	(1)	tells	us	that	it	has	its	roots	in	incongruity	between	deeper	desire	and	reality;	but	sometimes	we	do	not	know	what	our	deeper	desires	are.	In	such	cases,	when	we	literally	do	not	know	what	we	want	out	of	life,	we	cannot	do	anything	about	it,	and	so	we	inevitably	experience	incongruity,	and	consequently	boredom.	As	Lars	Svendsen	puts	it:																																																									46	Wangh	(1975:	541),	quoting	Peter	Hartocollis	47	Praktikos	12,	in	Bamberger	(1981:	18-19).	48	Boredom,	then,	is	not	quite	the	same	thing	as	the	“ennui”	Kuhn	examines,	since	he	regards	this	as	coming	from	within	the	individual	and	has	nothing	to	do	with	external	circumstances.	See	Kuhn	(1976:	12).	We	can	express	this	by	saying	that	boredom	always	has	an	object	–	one	is	bored	
with	something,	even	if	it	is	as	non-specific	as	the	current	situation	as	a	whole.	Also	note	that	our	definition	makes	boredom	the	precise	opposite	of	“enjoyment”,	as	defined	by	Richard	Swinburne	as	being	in	a	situation	where	one’s	desires	do	match	the	circumstances.	See	Swinburne	(2017:	350).	
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	 Boredom	normally	arises	when	we	cannot	do	what	we	want	to	do,	or	have	to	do	something	we	do	not	want	to	do.	But	what	about	when	we	have	no	idea	of	what	we	want	to	do,	when	we	have	lost	the	capacity	to	get	our	bearings	in	life?	Then	we	can	find	ourselves	in	a	profound	boredom	that	is	reminiscent	of	a	lack	of	willpower,	because	the	will	cannot	get	a	firm	grip	anywhere.49		If	our	analysis	is	correct,	this	“profound	boredom”	is	not	a	fundamentally	different	kind	of	experience	from	everyday	boredom.	It	is	simply	long-term	boredom,	exacerbated	not	only	by	the	self-perpetuating	nature	of	all	boredom	but	by	the	sufferer’s	inability	to	act	to	achieve	her	desires	because	she	does	not	know	what	they	are.	Sometimes,	as	Svendsen	argues,	the	bored	person	does	not	realise	she	is	bored	until	afterwards,	so	ingrained	has	the	experience	become.50		This	is	the	kind	of	chronic,	profound	boredom	that,	according	to	Williams,	would	inevitably	beset	the	blessed	in	heaven	and	cause	them,	eventually,	to	prefer	annihilation.	But	we	can	now	see	that	“profound	boredom”	has	two	root	causes:	first,	incongruity,	and	second,	ignorance.	It	is	because	the	bored	person’s	desires	lack	congruity	with	reality	that	she	becomes	bored,	and	it	is	because	she	does	not	know	what	her	desires	are	that	she	remains	bored.		This	strongly	suggests	that	BDD	is	false.	If	boredom	has	a	specific	cause,	then	in	the	absence	of	that	cause,	boredom	will	not	arise.	We	do	not	necessarily	need	something	to	interest	us	if	are	to	avoid	becoming	bored.	It	is,	of	course,	a	fact	of	life	that	we	generally	do	become	bored	if	there	is	nothing	to	interest	us	–	but	this	is	a	contingent	fact,	not	a	necessary	one.	It	is	true	only	because	we	do,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	desire	something	to	occupy	our	attention.	In	particular,	we	desire	to	do	something	purposive	that	we	can	envisage	progressing	into	the	future.	But	it	is	not	a	necessary	truth	that	we	have	such	a	desire.	We	can	see	this	if	we	imagine	the	case	of	a	person	with	no	desires	at	all,	not	even	subconscious	ones.	Such	a	person	is,	perhaps,	conceptually	possible,	even	if	one	has	never	actually	existed.	But	it	is	hard	to	see	how	such	a	person	could	become	bored	at	all.	If	boredom	arises	from	incongruity	between	desire	and	circumstance,	then	a	person	with	no	desires	can	never	experience	that	incongruity.	Even	in	the	absence	of	anything	to	interest	her,	she	will	not	become	bored.		BDD,	then,	is	not	necessarily	true.	It	may	be	contingently	true,	at	least	for	most	of	us	most	of	the	time.	Some	of	our	desires	are	such	that	if	we	cannot	act	in	certain	ways	we	will	experience	incongruity,	and	boredom	results.	But	even	if	this	is	the	case,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	case.	We	might	not	have	had	those	desires.			
Desire	and	serenity		If	BDD	is	not	true,	Williams’	argument	falls	apart.	There	is	no	reason	to	grant	him	his	suppressed	premise:		
																																																								49	Svendsen	(2005:	19)	50	Svendsen	(2005:		119-21)	
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(SP)	Given	enough	time,	a	lack	of	activity	will	become	boring	to	a	person	who	has	stability	of	character.		It	is	perfectly	possible	for	a	person	to	have	stability	of	character	without	becoming	bored	if	that	person	has	no	desires.	But	this	may	not	seem	to	be	enough	to	overcome	the	Boredom	Problem.	If	the	only	way	to	ensure	that	the	blessed	are	not	bored	is	to	deprive	them	of	all	desire,	does	this	not	strip	away	their	humanity?	Would	anyone	want	to	exist	in	a	state	with	no	desire	at	all?		These	objections	are	strong,	but	there	are	other	ways	around	this	problem.	Boredom,	as	we	have	seen,	comes	about	from	incongruity	between	desire	and	reality:	we	want	to	fulfil	our	desires,	but	if	we	are	in	a	situation	where	this	is	impossible,	we	become	frustrated.	If,	conversely,	all	of	our	desires	were	to	become	fulfilled,	we	might	not	become	bored,	but	we	might	cease	to	be	recognisably	human.	But	there	is	a	third	possibility,	because	desires	are	not	restricted	to	the	two	states	of	fulfilled	and	unfulfilled.		Many	of	our	desires	are	desires	to	achieve	something.	Once	it	is	achieved,	the	desire	goes	away.	For	example,	I	might	desire	to	win	the	lottery.	Once	I	have	won	it,	I	no	longer	have	such	a	desire;	it	has	been	satisfied	and	extinguished	no	matter	what	happens	in	the	future.	But	other	desires	are	not	so	easily	satisfied.	Suppose	I	desire	not	merely	to	win	the	lottery	but	to	remain	a	millionaire.	As	long	as	I	am	a	millionaire,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	desire	is	satisfied.	But	it	remains	satisfied	only	for	as	long	as	I	remain	a	millionaire.	If	I	lose	my	money,	the	desire	is	frustrated.		Call	such	a	desire	a	stability	desire.	Stability	desires	are	not	like	those	desires	that	Aristotle	puzzled	about,	such	as	the	desire	for	one’s	children	to	be	successful,	which	cannot	be	satisfied	while	one	lives.51	My	desire	to	remain	a	millionaire	is	satisfied	for	as	long	as	I	retain	my	money.	But	it	is	not	thereby	extinguished.		We	can	imagine	a	person	who	has	desires,	but	the	only	desires	she	has	are	stability	desires.	Call	such	a	state	one	of	perfect	serenity.	Provided	her	situation	does	not	change	in	any	relevant	way,	a	serene	person	cannot	become	bored.	That	incongruence	between	desire	and	circumstance	which	is	essential	for	boredom	can	never	arise.	And	unlike	the	case	of	the	person	with	no	desires	at	all,	the	serene	person	does	seem	conceivable.	She	certainly	has	desires,	but	they	are	all	desires	to	remain	as	she	is,	not	desires	for	something	new,	and	they	are	therefore	continuously	satisfied	by	the	maintenance	of	the	current	situation.52		Clearly,	this	state	of	perfect	serenity	would	be	happy.	It	might,	on	the	face	of	it,	sound	boring	–	but	if	so,	this	is	because	we	non-serene	people	often	feel	a	desire	for	change	and	activity.	The	bored	millionaire	is	bored	precisely	because,																																																									51	Nicomachean	Ethics	1100a.	On	this	topic,	see	Solomon	(1976).	52	For	simplicity’s	sake	I	assume	throughout	here	that	“serenity”	involves	having	only	stability	desires,	but	provided	that	enough	of	a	person’s	most	fundamental	desires	are	stability	desires,	perhaps	she	could	still	be	immune	to	boredom	even	if	she	also	has	some	non-stability	desires.	If	this	is	so	then	total	serenity	may	not	be	necessary	for	immunity	to	boredom,	but	it	is	surely	sufficient.	I	am	grateful	to	Tim	Mawson	for	raising	this	point.	
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subconsciously,	she	does	not	want	to	lead	the	life	she	thinks	she	is	enjoying.	But	this	does	not	apply	to	the	serene	person,	whose	subconscious	desires	are	perfectly	aligned	with	her	current	situation.			If	the	argument	so	far	is	correct,	then	we	can	say,	first,	that	a	serene	person	is	conceptually	possible;	and,	second,	that	a	serene	person	cannot	be	bored.	If	divine	omnipotence	includes	the	ability	to	bring	about	any	conceptually	possible	situation,	it	seems	that	God	could	see	to	it	that	the	blessed	in	heaven	are	serene,	and	therefore	that	they	do	not	become	bored.	As	a	solution	to	the	Boredom	Problem,	however,	this	is	somewhat	empty.	In	themselves,	not	all	stability	desires	are	desires	we	would	think	it	worth	having	for	all	eternity.	The	man	whose	sole	desire	is	to	stare	at	the	wall	will,	when	provided	with	the	wall,	avoid	boredom	indefinitely	–	but	it	does	not	follow	that	he	is	experiencing	heavenly	bliss,	or	even	that	he	is	particularly	happy,	or	that	we	would	envy	him.53		In	response	to	this,	we	can	point	out	that	it	is	one	thing	to	address	the	Boredom	Problem,	quite	another	to	give	a	description	of	heaven.	If,	by	ensuring	that	the	blessed	have	only	stability	desires,	God	can	see	to	it	that	they	never	become	bored,	then	the	Boredom	Problem	has	been	overcome	–	irrespective	of	precisely	
which	stability	desires	they	have.	But	our	account	would	be	more	satisfying	if	we	could	go	beyond	this	and	consider	what	stability	desires	they	could	be,	and	also	what	the	blessed	are	supposed	to	do	for	eternity	in	their	serenity,	and	how	this	relates	to	the	religious	life	on	earth.		Fortunately,	the	Christian	tradition	contains	resources	to	sketch	a	possible	answer	to	these	questions.	It	is	not	a	great	over-simplification	to	say	that	all	Christian	spiritual	writing	is	intended	to	help	people	diminish	their	desire	for	created	things	and	increase	their	desire	for	God	alone.	Evagrius	Ponticus	–	cited	throughout	the	boredom	literature	as	one	of	the	first	writers	to	analyse	the	problem	–	believed	that	the	purpose	of	the	ascetic	lifestyle	was	to	extinguish	“the	flames	of	desire”.54	This,	he	thought,	would	result	in	apatheia,	or	passionlessness.	But	apatheia	was	not,	for	Evagrius,	the	absence	of	all	desire.	It	brought	about	
agape,	or	love.	Evagrius	could,	accordingly,	write	that	“agape	is	the	daughter	of	
apatheia”.55	The	monk	who	followed	Evagrius’	instructions	would	find	his	desires	for	material	things	fading	away,	and	his	desire	for	God	increasing.	This,	for	Evagrius,	was	the	definitive	way	to	defeat	the	demon	of	acedie.		Evagrius	was	just	one	author	in	a	wider	tradition	of	Christian	spirituality	that	drew,	ultimately,	on	Platonism	as	much	as	on	the	Bible.	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	for	example,	sees	the	spiritual	journey	as	one	of	increasing	desire	for	God.56	For	Augustine,	God	draws	people	to	him	through	Christ,57	but	this	is	a	gradual	process	in	which	people’s	love	for	God	is	kindled	and	nourished.	As	Augustine	illustrates	in	his	own	anguished	cry	–	“I	have	learnt	to	love	you	late,	Beauty	at																																																									53	I	am	grateful	(again)	to	Tim	Mawson	for	this	point	and	example.	54	Bamberger	(1981:	15,	29)	55	Bamberger	(1981:	81,	84)	56	Life	of	Moses	II.231-32,	in	Malherbe	and	Ferguson	(1978:	114-15)	57	Tractates	on	John’s	Gospel	26.4	
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once	so	ancient	and	so	new!”58	–	the	desire	for	God	is	something	that	must	increase	gradually	throughout	a	person’s	life.		Suppose	we	adopt	this	conception	of	the	spiritual	journey	as	consisting	of	cultivating	the	desire	for	God,	and	reducing	other	desires.	It	would	be	reasonable	to	think	that	the	destination	of	that	journey	is	a	state	in	which	desire	for	God	is	maximised	and	other	desires	are	wholly	absent,	or	as	absent	as	it	is	possible	to	be.	Such	a	person	would	wish	only	to	remain	in	the	presence	of	God.	If	that	person	was	actually	in	the	presence	of	God,	her	desire	to	remain	there	would	be	a	stability	desire,	and	she	would	be	in	a	state	of	serenity.59	On	this	view,	the	state	of	the	blessed	in	heaven	is	quite	different	from	their	state	on	earth,	but	heaven	is	the	culmination	of	the	earthly	journey.60	And	one	might	add	that,	to	the	degree	that	a	person	feels	both	the	desire	for	God	and	the	presence	of	God	in	her	earthly	life,	she	is	participating	in	a	foretaste	of	heaven.		
Inactivity	and	rest		We	have	a	picture	of	heaven	in	which	the	blessed	serenely	desire	to	be	in	God’s	presence	and	this	desire	is	eternally	fulfilled.	But	what	would	they	actually	do?		As	we	have	seen,	much	of	the	literature	on	heaven	and	the	Boredom	Problem	revolves	around	trying	to	identify	some	activity	which	could	never	become	boring.	I	have	argued	that	this	is	a	mistaken	strategy.	We	have	already	seen	that	BBD	is	false,	and	that	if	the	blessed	are	serene	–	having	only	stability	desires	–	they	will	not	become	bored.	If	this	is	so	then	we	do	not	need	to	assume	that	they	will	be	engaging	in	any	activity	at	all.	If	the	desire	of	the	blessed	is	for	God	alone,	then	they	wish	only	to	remain	in	God’s	presence.	And	if	they	are	in	God’s	presence,	they	are	supremely	happy.	Their	desire	is	satisfied	as	long	as	they	remain	in	God’s	presence,	and	they	are	assured,	moreover,	that	this	state	of	affairs	will	continue.		It	is	important	to	note	that	this	does	not	require	that	the	blessed	exist	in	some	kind	of	timeless	state.61	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	why	a	timeless	view	of																																																									58	Confessions	10.27,	in	Pine-Coffin	(2012:	231)	59	It	need	not	be	the	case	that	all	the	blessed	have	their	desire	for	God	maximised.	Presumably	all	of	them	desire	God,	but	some	might	desire	God	more	than	others.	Thomas	Aquinas	envisages	precisely	this	situation	(ST	q.	12	a.	6)	when	he	argues	that	the	blessed	have	varying	degrees	of	charity,	and	therefore	varying	degrees	of	desire	for	God,	and	they	all	perceive	God	to	the	degree	that	they	desire	God.	This	seems	to	be	exactly	the	kind	of	stability	desire	I	am	discussing.	I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	TheoLogica	for	pointing	this	out.	We	may	also	say	that	if	desire	for	God	can	vary	in	this	way,	then	there	is	variety	among	the	blessed	–	they	are	not	all	exactly	the	same	as	each	other,	which	also	seems	to	be	a	desirable	conclusion.	60	This	provides	an	answer	to	the	question:	if,	in	heaven,	the	blessed	have	only	the	desire	for	God,	will	they	not	be	fundamentally	different	from	us	here	on	earth?	Does	this	not	raise	problems	of	personal	identity	and	continuity?	If,	however,	we	conceive	of	the	state	of	perfect	desire	for	God	as	a	culmination	of	a	growing	desire	that	develops	throughout	a	person’s	earthly	life,	and	which	they	may	wish	to	nurture,	as	Augustine	did,	the	problem	dissolves.	I	am	grateful	to	Robin	LePoidevin	for	raising	this	issue.	61	Silverman	(2017:	17)	portrays	all	“static”	views	of	heaven	as	incorporating	the	idea	that	heaven	is	atemporal,	but	this	is	not	accurate.	
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heaven	is	not	plausible.62	Certainly	a	period	of	time	in	which	nothing	happens	would	be	very	different	from	time	as	we	experience	it	now,	but	it	would	not	be	true	timelessness	of	the	kind	that	God	is	classically	supposed	to	experience.	It	might,	perhaps,	be	something	like	the	state	Richard	Swinburne	has	attributed	to	God	before	creation.	For	Swinburne,	God	is	temporal,	but	since	no	events	occurred	before	creation,	God	existed	at	that	time	in	a	state	very	unlike	the	temporality	we	experience.	In	fact,	“no	period	of	God’s	existence	would	have	been	of	any	particular	length,	finite	or	infinite”.63	It	is	at	least	conceivable	that	something	like	this	could	apply	to	the	blessed:	they	are	temporal,	but	lacking	change,	they	experience	time	very	differently	from	us,	and	their	time	in	heaven	cannot	be	assigned	any	particular	length.			The	notion	that	heaven	is	a	place	of	contemplation	of	God	is,	of	course,	deeply	embedded	within	the	Christian	tradition.	It	is	effectively	the	“beatific	vision”	described	by	Thomas	Aquinas	and	others:	a	state	in	which	the	blessed	enjoy	God,	fully	and	perfectly.64	But	the	version	of	this	view	that	I	am	sketching	here,	where	the	blessed	may	enjoy	God’s	presence	without	engaging	in	any	activity,	has	especially	striking	similarities	to	the	Orthodox	spiritual	tradition,	with	its	strong	tradition	of	conceiving	the	spiritual	life	as	involving	stillness	in	the	face	of	God,	as	expressed	in	silent	prayer.	Theophan	the	Recluse,	for	example,	stated	that	“The	principal	thing	is	to	stand	before	God	with	the	intellect	in	the	heart,	and	to	go	on	standing	before	him	unceasingly	day	and	night,	until	the	end	of	life.”65	Kallistos	Ware	comments	that	this	illustrates	how,	for	the	Orthodox	spiritual	tradition,		 to	pray	is	to	stand	before	God	–	not	necessarily	to	ask	for	things	or	even	to	speak	in	words	but	to	enter	into	a	personal	relationship	with	God,	a	meeting	“face	to	face,”	which	at	its	most	profound	is	expressed	not	in	speech	but	in	silence…	It	should	constitute	not	so	much	something	that	we	do	from	time	to	time	as	something	that	we	are	all	the	time.66			The	spiritual	practices	associated	with	the	Orthodox	tradition,	such	as	the	use	of	the	Jesus	Prayer	and	the	breathing	techniques	of	hesychast	mysticism,	are	intended	to	facilitate	this.	For	the	follower	of	these	practices,	the	verbal	repetition	of	the	prayer	and	the	somatic	rhythms	produce	a	non-cognitive,	non-discursive	prayerful	state	in	which	she	contemplates	the	divine	without	words,	images,	or	activity.67																																																										62	This	topic	lies	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	see	Hallett	(2001,	280-81),	who	considers	the	claim	that	heaven	is	atemporal	(and	therefore	cannot	become	boring)	and	rejects	it.	In	my	view	Hallett’s	arguments	are	decisive.	There	is	also	no	room	here	for	a	proper	consideration	of	the	related	notion	that	heaven	is	of	finite	duration,	but	approached	asymptotically	via	a	series	of	infinitesimal	intervals.	Suffice	to	say,	for	now,	that	I	am	not	convinced	that	this	solves	the	problem	because	it	does	not	tell	us	what	it	is	like	to	experience	such	a	heaven.	It	would	surely	have	to	be	experienced	either	as	if	it	were	of	infinite	duration,	or	as	if	it	were	of	finite	duration.	On	the	former,	the	problem	of	boredom	remains.	On	the	latter,	the	concept	of	an	eternal	afterlife	is	undermined	entirely.	(I	am	grateful	to	Mark	Wynn	for	raising	this	suggestion.)	63	Swinburne	(2016:	230)	64	ST	Supp.	q	92	65	Quoted	by	Ware	(1985:	395)	66	Ware	(1985:	395),	italics	original	 	67	See	e.g.	Gregory	of	Sinai,	On	Commandments	and	Doctrines	etc.	2,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	264)	
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Gregory	of	Sinai,	one	of	the	most	important	authors	in	this	tradition,	emphasises	its	difficulty	and	the	need	for	adherents	to	work	hard.	The	hesychast	monk	does	not	lead	a	life	of	inactivity:	he	must	toil	to	focus	his	mind	on	prayer.68	But	Gregory	also	makes	it	clear	that	this	hard	work	is	not	eternal.	Its	goal	is	to	produce	a	state	of	“stillness”,	which	is	the	key	to	the	vision	of	God:		 In	whatever	work	we	engage	patience	gives	birth	to	courage,	courage	to	commitment,	commitment	to	perseverance,	and	perseverance	to	an	increase	in	the	work	done.	Such	additional	labor	quells	the	body’s	dissolute	impulses	and	checks	the	desire	for	sensual	indulgence.	Thus	checked,	desire	gives	rise	to	spiritual	longing,	longing		to	love,	love	to	aspiration,	aspiration	to	ardor,	ardor	to	self-galvanizing,	self-galvanizing	to	assiduousness,		assiduousness	to	prayer,	and	prayer	to	stillness.	Stillness	gives	birth	to	contemplation,	contemplation	to	spiritual	knowledge,	and	knowledge	to	the	apprehension	of	the	mysteries.69		This	state	of	stillness	cannot	be	perfect	in	this	life,	but	it	will	be	in	the	next	life,	when,	according	to	Gregory,	human	beings	will	gain	“immutability”	in	a	“state	of	
changeless	deification”.70		We	now	have	the	resources	to	reply	to	one	of	the	arguments	in	favour	of	the	dynamic	view	of	heaven.71	This	argument	can	be	summarised	like	this:		 (1) The	life	of	the	blessed	in	heaven	should	be	similar	in	form	to	life	on	earth.	(2) Life	on	earth	is	characterised	by	activity,	work,	and	development.	(3) Therefore,	the	life	of	the	blessed	in	heaven	should	be	characterised	by	activity,	work,	and	development.		But	for	writers	such	as	Theophan	and	Gregory,	premise	(1)	is	false.	Although	they	agree	that	the	spiritual	life	is	characterised	by	hard	work,	they	hold	that	this	hard	work	has	a	purpose	beyond	itself.	If	the	religious	devotee	finds	that	her	spiritual	labour	yields	results,	and	she	grows	in	understanding	and	devotion	to	God,	this	is	not	because	the	labour	itself	constitutes	spiritual	growth	or	devotion.	Rather,	it	is	only	a	means	to	an	end,	and	ultimately	the	labour	will	cease,	having	achieved	its	end.		The	sixth-century	hermit	Barsanuphias	of	Gaza	illustrated	this	when	he	wrote:	“When	you	arrive	at	the	point	of	stillness,	then	you	shall	find	rest	with	grace”.72	This	connection	between	stillness	and	rest	is	significant,	because	it	fits	with	the	common	conception	of	heaven	as	eternal	rest.	Jürgen	Moltmann	articulates	a	similar	idea	when	he	states	that	he	believes	“that	God’s	history	with	our	lives	will	go	on	after	our	deaths,	until	that	completion	has	been	reached	in	which	a	soul	finds	rest”.73	And	this	aspiration	to	rest	is	found	throughout	popular	piety	and																																																									68	See	e.g.	Gregory	of	Sinai,	On	Commandments	and	Doctrines	etc.	14,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	272-73),	my	italics	69	Further	Texts	5,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	254)	70	On	Commandments	and	Doctrines	etc.	8,	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	213)	(my	italics)	71	Arguments	of	this	form	can	be	found	–	implicitly	or	explicitly	–	in	Silverman	(2017:	27)	and	Swinburne	(2017:	355-56).	72	Letter	789,	quoted	in	Chryssavgis	(2012:	267)	73	Moltmann	(2001:	66)	
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liturgy.	We	do	not	usually	hope	that	the	dead	find	eternal	activity;	we	do	not	inscribe	agat	in	pace	on	gravestones.	Consider	the	prayer	of	John	Henry	Newman:		 Support	us,	O	Lord,	All	the	day	long	of	this	life,	Until	the	shadows	lengthen	and	the	evening	comes,	The	busy	world	is	hushed	And	the	fever	of	life	is	done.	Then,	Lord,	in	your	mercy,	grant	us	a	safe	lodging,	A	holy	rest,	and	peace	at	the	last.74		Josef	Staudinger,	similarly,	writes:			 Heaven	is	the	great	haven	of	rest	when	this	life	is	over.	The	river	of	time	that	ran	its	chequered	course	amid	anguish	and	suffering,	care	and	worry,	has	now	flowed	into	the	region	of	eternal	calm.	A	deep	peace,	gentle,	inexpressibly	sweet,	possesses	the	soul,	a	peace	such	as	the	world	cannot	give	and	which	the	soul	can	enjoy	only	by	being	absorbed	by	the	ocean	of	peace	which	is	God	himself,	to	be	folded	for	ever	in	its	embrace…	It	is	the	great	sabbatical	rest	of	God	into	which	the	soul	has	entered;	for	“he	that	is	entered	into	his	rest,	the	same	hath	rested	from	his	works,	as	God	did	from	his”	(Hebr.	4,	10).75		Some	have	tried	to	reconcile	this	language	with	a	dynamic	view	of	heaven.	For	example,	Henry	Eyster	Jacobs	tells	us	that	the	language	of	rest	refers	only	to	“the	toil	and	trouble	of	this	life”,	and	does	not	mean	an	end	to	progress	and	change.76	But	as	we	have	seen,	there	is	no	need	for	such	an	assumption,	because	the	happiness	of	the	blessed	can	be	secured	without	it.		
Three	objections		But	is	happiness	sufficient?	There	are	three	elements	to	the	heavenly	life	which,	it	might	be	argued,	the	view	developed	here	cannot	accommodate.	These	are	its	bodily	nature,	its	communal	aspect,	and	the	need	for	virtue.		One	objection	to	conceptions	of	heaven	based	on	the	beatific	vision	is	that	they	offer	no	role	for	the	body,	which	seems	not	to	be	required	simply	to	contemplate	the	divine	beauty	for	eternity.	But	Christian	orthodoxy	has	always	held	that	the	blessed	will	enjoy	a	bodily	existence.77	Thus	we	find	Aquinas	arguing	that	the	souls	of	the	departed	can	enjoy	the	beatific	vision	fully	before	being	reunited	with	their	bodies,	while	also	insisting,	rather	feebly,	that	union	with	the	body	is	still	necessary	for	perfect	happiness	because	this	is	the	natural	state	of	the	soul.78	The	problem	might	be	thought	worse	for	a	conception	of	heaven	that	involves	no	activity	on	the	part	of	the	blessed	–	if	they	do	nothing,	they	have	even	less	need	for	a	body.79																																																											74	from	“Wisdom	and	Innocence”,	Sermons	on	Subjects	of	the	Day	75	Staudinger	(1964:	128,	130)	76	Quoted	in	Silverman	(2017:	18)	77	See	e.g.	Morreall	(1980:	33-34)	78	ST	I-ii,	q.	4	aa.	5-6.	See	Trabbic	(2011:	558-63)	79	I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	TheoLogica	for	raising	this	objection.	
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I	do	not	think	this	is	a	very	strong	objection,	because	it	could	equally	well	apply	to	dynamic	conceptions	of	heaven.	If	it	is	possible	to	contemplate	God	without	a	body,	it	is	presumably	just	as	possible	to	grow	in	knowledge	and	wisdom	about	God	without	a	body	too.	There	is	nothing	inconsistent	about	supposing	that	the	blessed	can	persist	in	a	state	of	serene	inactivity	with	a	body,	even	if	it	is	true	that	such	a	state	does	not	require	a	body,	and	so	there	is	nothing	here	at	odds	with	Christian	orthodoxy.	More	strongly,	we	might	say	that	the	objection	assumes	that	disembodied	existence	is	possible	at	all,	which	is	controversial.	Perhaps	it	is	not	possible,	in	which	case	the	blessed	will	require	bodies	if	they	are	to	exist	in	any	state,	whether	active	or	not.80		The	second	objection	is	that	heaven	is	supposed	to	be	communal.	Consider,	for	example,	the	depiction	of	the	heavenly	Jerusalem	in	Revelation	21-22.	But	an	eternity	spent	doing	nothing	does	not	require	the	participation	of	others,	removing	any	role	for	community	in	the	heavenly	life.81		I	do	not	think	it	is	correct	to	think	that	a	purely	passive	experience	is	unaltered	by	sharing	it	with	others.	Most	people	prefer	to	go	to	the	cinema	or	the	theatre	in	company,	even	though	they	may	not	do	anything	during	the	performance,	even	speak	to	their	companions	–	at	least	if	they	have	good	manners.	The	mere	fact	that	the	experience	is	shared	with	others	enhances	it.	Perhaps	this	could	apply	to	heaven	as	well.	If	so,	we	might	modify	the	stability	desires	of	the	blessed:	perhaps	they	desire	not	merely	to	be	in	the	presence	of	God,	but	to	be	in	the	presence	of	God	together	with	others.	It	would,	after	all,	be	reasonable	for	the	blessed	to	want	other	people	to	enjoy	perfect	happiness	as	well.	Such	a	stability	desire	would	require	the	communal	aspect	to	remain	fulfilled.		The	most	serious	objection	to	this	view	of	heaven,	though,	is	that	we	would	normally	want	to	say	that	the	blessed	are	virtuous.	Following	both	Augustine	and	Aquinas,	Timothy	Pawl	and	Kevin	Timpe	broadly	define	virtues	as	“dispositions	of	individuals	by	means	of	which	they	act	well”.82	If	the	blessed	never	act,	then	they	cannot	have	such	dispositions	and	cannot	be	thought	virtuous.		One	might	respond	by	pointing	out	that	a	virtuous	person	is	still	virtuous	even	when	asleep.	A	person	does	not	have	to	be	exercising	a	virtue,	or	even	doing	anything	at	all,	to	be	considered	virtuous,	because	the	disposition	to	act	virtuously	persists.	But	a	person	who	is	asleep	retains	that	disposition	because	she	might	wake	up	and	exercise	it.	We	would	be	less	inclined	to	call	a	person	in	an	irreversible	coma	virtuous,	because	she	has	lost	that	disposition.	Similarly,	if	the	blessed	are	permanently	resting,	they	will	never	be	disposed	to	act	virtuously.																																																									80	Morreall	(1980:	34)	considers	and	rejects	this	response,	on	the	grounds	that	Christian	eschatology	requires	it	to	be	possible	for	a	person’s	soul,	as	her	identity-bearer,	to	exist	without	the	body.	Certainly	Christian	tradition	supposes	this	but	I	do	not	think	it	as	essential	to	Christian	
orthodoxy	as	Morreall	claims.	81	I	am	grateful	to	Andrew	Roberts,	as	well	as	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	TheoLogica,	for	raising	this	objection.	82	Pawl	and	Timpe	(2017:	98)	
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	Nevertheless,	we	can	think	of	dispositions	modally.	Even	a	person	who	is	unable	to	act	can	meaningfully	be	said	to	have	certain	dispositions	to	act	in	the	sense	that	she	would	act	in	such	a	way	if	she	were	able.	If	a	virtuous	person	and	a	vicious	person	are	both	lying	in	irreversible	comas,	they	may	be	equally	incapable	of	practising	virtue	and	vice	–	but	we	nevertheless	would	recognise	that,	if	they	were	able	to	act,	they	would	not	act	similarly.		By	way	of	illustration,	consider	whether	God	should	be	called	virtuous.	Aquinas	comments	that	virtues	associated	with	the	will,	such	as	justice,	can	be	ascribed	to	God,	but	others	–	such	as	political	virtues,	and	temperance,	fortitude,	and	meekness	–	cannot.83	And	surely	it	would	be	odd	to	suppose	that	God	is	virtuous	in	the	same	way	as	human	beings.	But	according	to	the	doctrine	of	incarnation,	God	the	Son	became	a	human	being,	and	exhibited	every	virtue	perfectly,	even	those	that	cannot	normally	be	ascribed	to	God.	It	would	seem,	then,	that	although	God	cannot	be	called	virtuous	in	the	same	way	that	human	beings	can,	God	can	be	said	to	have	a	disposition	such	that,	were	God	to	become	a	human	being,	God	would	act	in	a	virtuous	way.	Neither	the	Father	nor	the	Holy	Spirit	has	become	incarnate,	and	so	neither	of	them	has	exhibited	(say)	the	virtue	of	temperance	–	but	we	can	be	confident	that	if	they	were	to	become	incarnate,	they	would	exhibit	that	virtue.		Similarly,	we	could	say	that	the	blessed	do	not	act	in	a	virtuous	way	–	but	this	is	not	because	they	lack	virtue.	Rather,	they	have	gone	beyond	the	kind	of	existence	in	which	virtues	are	exhibited	at	all.	Were	they	to	re-enter	an	earthly	human	existence	–	if	such	a	thing	were	possible	–	they	would	exhibit	the	human	virtues,	just	as	the	divine	Son	did.			This,	again,	finds	support	in	the	hesychast	tradition.	Gregory	of	Sinai	writes:		 The	principle	and	source	of	the	virtues	is	a	good	disposition	of	the	will,	that	is	to	say,	an	aspiration	for	goodness	and	beauty.	God	is	the	source	and	ground	of	all	supernal	goodness.	Thus	the	principle	of	goodness	and	beauty	is	faith…	it	is	this	for	which	the	monk	seeks	when	he		plunges	into	the	depths	of	stillness	and	it	is	this	for	which	he	sells	all	his	own	desires	through	obedience	to	the		commandments,	so	that	he	may	acquire	it	even	in	this	life.84		On	this	view,	then,	what	we	call	virtue	ultimately	derives	from	having	a	will	perfectly	attuned	to	God.		It	is	because	the	virtuous	person	has	such	a	will	that	she	has	a	disposition	to	act	in	a	certain	way.	Because	the	blessed	desire	only	God,	their	wills	are	perfectly	attuned	in	such	a	way.	So	even	though	they	do	not	act	in	a	virtuous	way,	because	they	do	not	act,	their	wills	are	such	that,	were	they	to	be	in	a	situation	where	action	were	appropriate,	they	would	act	in	a	way	we	would	call	virtuous.			
The	exhaustion	problem																																																										83	ST	I	q	21	a	1	84	Gregory	of	Sinai,	On	Stillness	and	Prayer	83	in	Palmer,	Sherrard,	and	Ware	(1995:	228)		
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For	many,	the	conception	of	heaven	that	I	have	articulated	here	is	an	intrinsically	repellent	one.	The	notion	of	an	eternity	of	inactivity	is,	for	some,	more	like	hell	than	heaven.	But	I	suspect	that	much	of	the	scholarly	fear	of	inactivity	–	and	of	boredom	itself	–	derives	more	from	the	personality	of	the	scholars	who	have	written	about	it	than	it	does	from	human	nature	in	general.	Many	academics	–	particularly	the	successful	ones	–	are	almost	driven	people,	constitutionally	incapable	of	putting	work	aside	even	on	holiday.85	Tellingly,	Lars	Svendsen	states	that	he	found	himself	writing	a	book	on	boredom	specifically	because	he	was	unable	to	do	nothing	at	all:		 After	having	completed	a	lengthy	research	project,	I	was	going	to	relax	and	do…	nothing.	But	that	turned	out	to	be	absolutely	impossible	to	carry	out.	Obviously,	I	was	unable	to	do	nothing.86		But	is	this	typical	of	human	beings	in	general?	Svendsen	himself	goes	on	to	express	a	kind	of	horrified	amazement	at	the	majority	of	people	who	work	all	day,	spend	four	hours	watching	TV	in	the	evening,	and	then	go	to	sleep.	Only	boredom,	he	thinks,	could	motivate	such	depressingly	passive	leisure	activity.	There	is	something	elitist,	even	classist,	about	such	denigration	of	the	leisure	habits	of	ordinary	people.	It	is	reminiscent	of	Aristotle’s	exhausting-sounding	dictum	that	the	purpose	of	relaxation	is	to	restore	our	energy	in	order	to	work,	as	opposed	to	the	notion	that	we	work	in	order	to	be	able	to	afford	to	relax.87	I	would	say	that	this	tells	us	more	about	Aristotle’s	personality	than	it	does	about	human	nature.	To	return	to	Svendsen’s	example,	could	it	not	be	the	case	that	so	many	people	devote	so	much	of	their	leisure	time	to	passive	forms	of	entertainment	not	just	for	convenience’	sake	but	because	they	enjoy	them?	Is	it	really	plausible	to	suppose	that	they	would	all	be	happier	if	they	spent	their	time	studying	philosophy,	or	learning	new	languages,	or	practising	musical	instruments	–	or	the	other	worthy	activities	that	philosophers	recommend?		To	my	mind,	at	least,	the	various	dynamic	conceptions	of	eternity	sound	unattractively	tiring.	Perhaps	that	says	more	than	I	might	wish	about	my	personality.	But	it	is	telling	that	so	much	has	been	written	about	the	problem	of	boredom	in	heaven,	and	the	need	to	ensure	that	the	blessed	will	be	eternally	active	and	progressing,	and	nothing	at	all	seems	to	have	been	written	about	the	opposing	problem,	that	of	exhaustion.	But	we	could	easily	construct	an	Exhaustion	Problem	to	parallel	Williams’	Boredom	Problem:		
																																																								85	I	have,	for	example,	personally	known	one	prominent	professor	to	catch	an	overnight	flight	home	at	the	end	of	an	exhausting	overseas	round	of	conferences	and	meetings,	land	early	in	the	morning,	and	then	travel	directly	from	the	airport	to	his	office,	declaring	himself	ready	for	“another	day	of	work”.	86	Svendsen	(2005:	7-8)	87	Nicomachean	Ethics	1176b28-1177a1.	Just	a	couple	of	pages	later	(1177b4-6),	Aristotle	seems	to	contradict	this	when	he	states	that	we	work	in	order	to	have	leisure.	But	for	Aristotle,	“leisure”	(σχολή)	is	not	to	be	used	for	idle	amusement,	but	for	improving	study	and	contemplation,	as	he	explains	in	Politics	1333a30-b5;	1334a11-40;	1337b29-1338a30.	Amusement	(παιδιά),	by	contrast,	is	a	sort	of	medicine	of	the	mind,	to	be	used	sparingly	to	restore	our	energies.	On	Aristotle	and	leisure,	see	Owens	(1981);	on	amusement,	see	Kraut	(1989:	164-66).	
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(1)	A	state	of	exhaustion,	continued	indefinitely,	would	eventually	become	intolerable.	(2)	There	are	only	a	finite	number	of	kinds	of	activities	a	person	can	engage	in.	(3)	To	be	meaningful,	immortality	must	involve	stability	of	character.	(4)	Given	enough	time,	any	set	of	activities	will	become	exhausting	to	a	person	who	has	stability	of	character.	(5)	Therefore,	any	meaningful	immortal	existence	would	eventually	become	intolerable.				One	might	seek	to	undermine	such	an	argument	by	denying	its	premise	(4):	the	blessed	need	not	suffer	exhaustion	at	all.	They	will,	in	the	words	of	the	prophet,	soar	on	wings	like	eagles,	and	run	and	not	grow	weary.88	Such	a	reply	envisages	that	our	natural	tendency	to	become	tired	in	this	life	is	a	contingent	fact	about	our	current	state,	something	that	God	can	remove	to	allow	us	to	enjoy	eternal	activity	in	the	next	life.	But	if	it	is	easy	to	suppose	that	God	can	change	people	so	that	they	do	not	become	exhausted	by	endless	activity,	it	is	surely	just	as	easy	to	suppose	that	God	can	change	people	so	that	they	do	not	become	bored	by	endless	inactivity.	The	fact	that	the	latter	seems	to	be	a	stumbling	block	for	many	writers	who	accept	the	former	without	complaint	is,	I	think,	due	more	to	personal	taste	than	to	any	significant	difference	between	the	two	cases.		
Conclusion		I	have	argued	that	the	Boredom	Argument	is	a	more	serious	problem	for	traditional	belief	in	heaven	than	is	commonly	realised.	The	dynamic	view	of	heaven,	fashionable	today	as	an	answer	to	this	problem,	does	not	succeed,	at	least	not	as	it	has	been	presented	to	date.	A	better	strategy	for	the	believer	in	heaven	is	to	question	the	Boredom	Argument’s	assumption	that	human	beings	tend	to	become	bored	by	default.	A	static	view	of	heaven,	in	which	the	blessed	enjoy	the	serenity	of	only	having	stability	desires,	can	explain	how	they	remain	happy	and	never	become	bored,	even	in	a	state	of	eternal	inactivity.89		
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